Why Can't a Woman Be More Like a Man? Female Leaders in Crisis Bargaining

Abigail S. Post* Paromita Sen†

This draft: June 9, 2017

Abstract

What is the impact of gender on international affairs? In this paper, we argue that existing theories of international relations often miss the crucial role of gendered perceptions in politics. We draw on research in experimental psychology and the comparative politics of gendered leadership to understand how gender influences reactions to female foreign policy. We argue that female leaders in particular face gender stereotypes that cause dispute opponents to underestimate their resolve during bargaining. Using data on the gender of leaders in militarized disputes, we find evidence of gender biases in bargaining interactions: Female-led states are more likely to have their disputes reciprocated and are consequently more likely to forcefully escalate a dispute than male-led governments. These findings point to the importance of stereotypes and cognitive biases when studying how the increasing heterogeneity of policymakers – and especially world leaders – impacts foreign policy.

Keywords: gender, bargaining, military dispute, stereotypes, leaders, foreign policy

*Ph.D. candidate, Department of Politics, University of Virginia, S183 Gibson Hall, 1540 Jefferson Park Avenue, Charlottesville, VA 22904 (asn9dp@virginia.edu).

†Ph.D. candidate, Department of Politics, University of Virginia, S183 Gibson Hall, 1540 Jefferson Park Avenue, Charlottesville, VA 22904 (ps5un@virginia.edu).

Introduction



Figure 1. *Female Heads of State 1960-2014*

The twentieth century saw an upsurge in women as heads of state (see Figure 1), and this trend has continued into the twenty-first century with the recent election of Theresa Major as Great Britain's second female Prime Minister. Hillary Clinton came closer than any woman before her to being elected the first female President of the United States. Scholars and policymakers alike are increasingly interested in how this change in the gender makeup of leaders might affect world affairs. These recent developments drive the central question of this paper: What is the impact of gender, specifically the gender of state leaders, on international politics?[1]

Although theories of foreign policy have begun to account for the gender of policymakers (e.g., Croco and Gartner 2014; Koch and Fulton 2011) and citizens (e.g., Dolan 2011; Eichenberg 2003; Guisinger 2016), they rarely explore the effect of gender on the highest levels of political office. There is some evidence suggesting that while female legislators have

[1]We use the word gender in the colloquial sense to differentiate between male and female or man and woman.

a pacifying effect on foreign policy, female executives have the opposite effect (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli and Boyer 2001). In particular, female leaders are thought to adopt more aggressive foreign policies in order to gain credibility in masculinized leadership positions (Dube and Harish 2017; Koch and Fulton 2011). On the other hand, Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015) find similar patterns for male and female military dispute initiation.[2] These studies of female leadership have one crucial factor in common: They compare the *behavior* of nations with women in and out of office. We approach gender in foreign policy from a different angle, analyzing audience *reactions* to female behavior. We argue that while gender may not distinguish behavioral patterns, gendered perceptions cause audiences to interpret and respond to female behavior differently.

The decision to focus on the gender of *leaders* reflects a recent trend in international relations research connecting leadership characteristics with foreign policy.[3] This research program demonstrates the importance of leadership characteristics for such things as dispute initiation, crisis behavior, and a host of other foreign policy outcomes. To date, these studies have found few reliable gender effects. Females may face different challenges as they rise to the top, but leadership positions are thought to select women with similar traits to men. Consequently, their policies differ little (e.g., Horowitz, Stam and Ellis 2015).

These theories of leaders miss the crucial role of gender stereotypes in international interactions. Experimental work and literature on the comparative politics of leadership has long demonstrated pervasive implicit and explicit gender biases in daily exchanges. Such research has honed in on two broad categories of gender stereotypes that shape female leadership at the executive level: communality and agency. Women are seen as more communal (warm, gentle, nurturing, etc.) but less agentic (aggressive, ambitious, dominant, etc.) compared to men. "However, leadership roles require agency" (Brescoll 2016: 416). Women who make it to the highest levels of office are said to emulate men with agentic leadership styles in order to compensate for their inherent disadvantage in such a masculinized role. Yet while

[2]For a review of the recent positivist literature of gender and international relations, see Reiter (2015).

[3]For a small sample of this research, see Byman and Pollack (2001); Chiozza and Goemans (2004, 2011*a*); Croco (2015); Debs and Goemans (2010); Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2015); Goemans (2000); Horowitz and Stam (2014); Saunders (2011).

women leaders may adopt agentic attributes – typically associated with men and leadership positions – to lead effectively, audiences interpret agency less favorably when it emanates from women rather than men (Heilman and Okimoto 2008; Okimoto and Brescoll 2010). These stereotypes are further exacerbated by the stereotype that women are more emotional than men. We argue that gendered perceptions cause international audiences to perceive females as less willing to follow through on hard-line policies, making them appear to be less resolved bargaining opponents. Compared with men, female leaders in turn must take even more aggressive actions to be establish credibility at the bargaining table.

We specifically investigate the role of gender stereotypes in international dispute bargaining as an area ideally suited for studying *reactions to* rather than the *behavior of* female leaders. Bargaining outcomes inevitably rely on reactions to one another's threats and promises, and we argue that females face unique challenges in this context. If females play to their traditional gender roles and espouse a communal/female/pacific foreign policy, they eschew valuable hard-line bargaining tactics. However, once they play to agentic/male/aggressive roles by threatening and/or initiating a dispute, the dispute opponent is more likely to discount the threat as a bluff and reciprocate the dispute. Female leaders then – but only then – escalate disputes to signal resolve. Thus, female leaders do not escalate because they are inherently more aggressive or insecure; rather, the biased response of the dispute opponent provokes escalatory behavior.

Our paper proceeds as follows. First, we explore the literature on leaders and foreign policy and the comparative politics of gendered leadership. Then, combining the insights of these literatures, we propose our own theory of gendered bargaining. We draw on evidence in experimental psychology to describe the mechanisms behind this theory. The third section presents quantitative evidence supporting our predictions. Using data on the gender of leaders in militarized interstate disputes, we find that female-led governments are more likely to have their disputes reciprocated by their opponent, and they are more likely to escalate a dispute through force. In the fourth section, we probe the theoretical mechanisms in a case study of Indira Gandhi's role in the Bangladeshi Liberation War of 1971. The final section concludes with a summary of our findings and implications for both theory and policy.

Gender, Leaders, and Bargaining

> *"I don't think a woman should be in any government job whatever. I mean, I really don't. The reason why I do is mainly because they are erratic. And emotional. Men are erratic and emotional, too, but the point is a woman is more likely to be."* – U.S. President Richard Nixon[4]

Early research on the subject of female leaders found that women behaved more aggressively in crisis bargaining, presumably to overcompensate for gender disadvantages (Caprioli and Boyer 2001). In this view, women who succeed as national political leaders have adopted masculine leadership styles to counteract gender stereotypes (Fukuyama 1998; Sykes 1993). There is also the view that female leaders are likely to be more effective in bargaining, because females are seen as more risk-averse and unlikely to bluff (Charness and Gneezy 2012). However, Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015: 177) recently found minimal differences by gender for dispute initiation and aggression. They argue that "contrary to conventional wisdom... women leaders do not necessarily come to power by emulating or trying to outdo their male counterparts, though that potentially happens as well. Nor are they, by definition, weak, conciliatory, and cooperative when facing international crises." Female and male leaders necessarily differ on some background experiences (motherhood, war experience, etc.), but these characteristics do not affect average conflict risk propensities.[5] In this view, female and male bargaining interactions should resemble one another, holding all else constant.

These findings and predictions are surprising given decades of research on the unique challenges that women face in leadership positions. Studies have shown that females must overcome various hurdles to leadership in the domestic political context, stemming from public preferences for "male" characteristics at higher levels of office (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Lawless (2004) finds that female presidential candidates face disadvantages when "men's issues" dominate the political agenda. Females in leadership especially face challenges in the national security realm: Swers (2007) finds that gender stereotypes often favor male

[4]Clyber (2001)

[5]These findings match up with other evidence in the literature on the recruitment of women for terrorist organizations (Bloom 2011; Eager 2016; Thomas and Bond 2015).

defense leadership, making it difficult for female senators to establish reputations on security. These studies represent a burgeoning research on public perceptions of female politicians, especially in the American political context (Bauer 2015; Dolan 2014; Fox and Lawless 2011; Hayes and Lawless 2013).[6]

At a broader theoretical level, Eagly and Karau (2002) note that the difficulty for women leaders lies in the mismatch of *gender* stereotypes with *leadership* stereotypes. The challenge is two-pronged. First, communal attributes (affectionate, helpful, kind, sympathetic, interpersonally sensitive, nurturant, gentle, etc.), which are identified as distinctly female, are divorced from successful leadership models. Second, when women embrace agentic leadership qualities (aggressive, ambitious, dominant, forceful, independent, daring, self-confident, competitive, etc.), which are identified as male, they often experience resistance and backlash from relevant audiences (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt 2001; Heilman and Okimoto 2008). Research shows that when female leaders adopt agentic traits to fit their leadership roles, observers view them as less competent leaders than their male counterparts.

The disconnect between these two stereotypes – that leadership requires agency and that women lack agentic attributes – is exacerbated by a third stereotype, the strongest of gender stereotypes: The belief that women are more emotional than men (Plant et al. 2000; Brescoll 2016). Because of this stereotype, audiences interpret (often implicitly) female policies as more emotional than equivalent male policies. Actual emotional displays further undermine female leadership – "especially when the emotion conveys dominance (e.g., anger or pride)," which is often associated with an agentic (male) leadership style (Brescoll 2016: 415). Women thus struggle to adopt successful leadership tactics, because gender stereotypes exclude them from effectively 1) making policy associated with agentic attributes and 2) expressing emotions which convey agency and leadership.

Additionally, agentic emotions and actions decrease evaluations of female competence and credibility. In a recent study of female leaders, "women's perceived competency drops by 35%... when they are judged as being 'forceful' or 'assertive"' (Maxfield, Grenny and McMillan 2015). In an experimental study of adult participants, Brescoll and Uhlmann

[6]This is just a small sample of the literature. For a recent and more comprehensive review, see Lawless (2015).

(2008: 268) "found that both male and female evaluators conferred lower status on angry female professionals than on angry male professionals." Other experimental evidence shows that women who adopt an aggressive leadership style receive more negative performance evaluations, while men receive *additional* credit for similar approaches (Heilman et al. 2004). Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2015: 589) find that "when a woman expresses anger this does not just make her seem less credible, but seems to make assessing her credibility irrelevant – instead, participants just became more confident in their own opinion." Thus, while anger or aggression help men govern effectively, the same tactics undermine perceptions of female leadership credibility (Hess et al. 2000; Zell, Krizan and Teeter 2015). Because of these stereotypes, audiences are more likely to view women as incompetent leaders, compared with men (Brescoll 2016: 411).

An important clarification is in order: Audiences infer a tradeoff between the ability to control outward emotional display and the ability to make important decisions in a rational, objective manner (Shields 2002). "Emotional" behavior is often equated with "irrational" behavior (Mercer 2005). According to the logic of some international relations theories, gender stereotypes regarding emotion should accordingly *benefit* females leaders in international bargaining by making their commitments appear more credible. Schelling (1966) argues that (male) leaders can engage in tactics of "rational irrationality" to make the opponent believe he will take an otherwise unlikely action.[7] Extrapolating from this argument, female emotion might consistently signal such irrationality, enhancing threat credibility.

However, theories of gendered leadership make it quite clear that this hand-tying tactic does *not* work in cases of female bargaining. In fact, the reality is quite the opposite: Female emotion signals weakness and irresolution, while male emotion signals strength and resolve (Brescoll and Uhlmann 2008). Due to gender stereotypes operating during interactions, female hard-line tactics signal both the unwillingness and inability to follow through on polices – clearly a handicap rather than an asset for establishing credibility during bargaining. Zammuner (2000) finds that female leaders are treated as unreliable during difficult situations due to their perceived emotional instability. Brescoll (2016: 418) discusses an experimental

[7]See Schelling's (1966) discussion on pages 36–43 of *Arms and Influence* in which he argues that "Sometimes we can get a little credit for not having everything quite under control. . . "

study in which while "people believed that men would control their emotions and 'intervene in the situation,' they believed that women would be unable to 'keep calm' and would thereby be 'confused' and 'bewildered' by the events." As a consequence, female leaders are considered less likely to stand firmly behind their decisions and more likely to back down from a policy if challenged (Brescoll 2016; Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2015). Thus, displaying emotion and feigning irrationality (or even being crazy) can enhance the credibility of male threats; but pervasive, implicit gender stereotypes regarding emotion undercut perceptions of female credibility in bargaining.

To sum up this diverse literature on gendered leadership and gender stereotypes: Aggressive, forceful actions signal agency, leadership, and masculinity. Gender stereotypes preclude females from successfully adopting agentic policies or expressing emotions that convey dominance. However, female leaders must adopt agentic tactics and/or express masculine emotions (often in the form of aggressive policy measures of forceful management tactics) to lead effectively. While such policies often convey resolved policies/leadership for men, such actions tend to communicate – due the gender stereotypes regarding emotion – that the female leader is neither willing nor able to follow through on a policy or policy stance. In turn, observers are likely to underestimate female resolve during bargaining situations.

Gender Stereotypes and Dispute Bargaining

> *"It's better not to argue with women... When people push boundaries too far, it's not because they are strong but because they are weak. But maybe weakness is not the worst quality for a woman."* – Vladmir Putin speaking about Hillary Clinton[8]

We argue that gender and leadership stereotypes operate during international interactions, especially during crisis bargaining. The literature on cognitive biases has found evidence that intense stress and situations of ambiguous information cause individuals to deploy schemas – essentially cognitive shortcuts – to process information (Dovidio and Gaertner

[8]Bohlen (2014)

2000; Fiske 2002; McDermott 2004). Thus, in situations of international crisis (situations of high stress), governments are most likely to draw on gender schemas to respond to female threats.[9] During dispute bargaining, international audiences should interpret hardline, aggressive ("angry") foreign policies emanating from female governments through the lens of gender bias. Since female agency is interpreted as emotional weakness rather than an indication of resolve or commitment, the dispute opponent will be more likely to view female threats and demands as easily challenged/resisted. Thus, threats, dispute initiation, and demonstrations of military force are less effective signals of resolve coming from female-led rather than male-led governments. Because the target state concludes that the female lacks resolve, it is more likely to resist female-instigated disputes. In response to this resistance, female-led governments must take more escalatory measures to demonstrate resolve.

As indicated throughout this paper, gender stereotypes often operate on an implicit, rather than the explicit, level (Eagly and Karau 2002; Goldin and Rouse 1997; Moss-Racusin et al. 2012). Indeed, schemas concerning race, gender, class, etc. are often unconscious, or implicit, and can clash with "explicit" attitudes or beliefs. Typically their usage changes based on increased exposure or awareness about their existence (Dovidio and Gaertner 2000; Fiske et al. 2002; Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald 2002). Our theory relies primarily on implicit gender stereotypes, but we do find unambiguous sexism throughout our case research. This is likely because gender norms are not the same across space and time: Some state leaders hold conventional Western feminine norms that reflect these biases on a more implicit level. Non-western (and some Western) bargaining opponents are more likely to hold explicit biases, in which "male leaders seem... unwilling to 'lose' to a women lest their masculinity be questioned" (Caprioli and Boyer 2001).[10] Additionally, the logic of gender stereotypes is not dependent on the gender of the opponent's leaders or government. Females are just as likely to exhibit bias against other women in various contexts, including business (Brescoll and Uhlmann 2008), education (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012), and law (Coffey and McLaughlin

[9]Granted, most studies regarding stereotypes have been conducted in the laboratory. However, an increasing number of these studies overcome the "college sophomores" problem by using adult samples in various contexts (including the business world, academia, and domestic politics).

[10]See also Bosson and Vandello (2011); Hunt, Gonsalkorale and Murray (2013); McGlen and Sarkees (1993); Willer et al. (2013).

2009).[11]

An apt illustration of explicit versus implicit gender stereotypes occurs during the lead-up to the Falklands War between Great Britain and Argentina. In negotiations with Argentine General Galtieri, the American negotiator Vernon Walters emphasized: "General, they *will* fight, and they will win..." In response, Galtieri insisted that the British would not fight and at one point said, "That woman wouldn't dare" (referring to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher). Walters stated, "Mr. President, 'that woman' has let a number of hunger strikers of her own basic ethnic origin starve themselves to death, without flickering an eyelash. I would not count on that if I were you."[12] Even when a female leader is clearly ready to back up her threat with force, the target may misinterpret her resolve. This miscalculation is often due, at least in part, to implicit gender biases. However, Galtieri's gendered comment regarding Thatcher indicates more explicit bias.

Because of the often implicit nature of these stereotypes, the gender of the leader in many ways shapes the gender identity of the ruling government (Goldstein 2001). Envision the way in which we label a government by the ruling leader, such as "Thatcher's government" or the "Obama Administration." Leaders do not rule alone, but their gender shapes many of the ruling dynamics and international perceptions. For this reason, we predict that gender biases will even permeate lower-level disputes that are often carried out by lower-level officers acting according to standard operating procedures. Accordingly, we use the terms "female leaders," "female governments," and "female-led states" interchangeably throughout this paper. Regardless of whether the stereotype operates implicitly or explicitly during specific cases, we expect average levels of reciprocation and escalation to be higher for female-led governments due to gender bias.

[11]The MID data set includes only three observations of female-female dyads, which is not enough information to allow us to test these arguments during international dispute bargaining.

[12]Quoted in Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1990: 176).

Hypotheses on Dispute Bargaining

Though our theory does not present a bargaining framework in the sense of a formal model, the intuition of the bargaining interaction is extremely consistent with one. The problem we address is one of asymmetric information leading to conflict. The female government initiates a conflict with some type of offer or demand. The target state has incomplete information about her resolve and so does not know whether to accept or reject the offer. In this case, the target state is even less likely to make the correct decision, because an inaccurate prior belief (gender bias) prevents the target from using the new information of the demand to update accurately. The target state therefore rejects the bargain, believing her to be irresolute. This rejection results in conflict.

Gender ultimately introduces an additional element of informational uncertainty into the bargaining calculus. When a male-led government initiates a dispute, the target state will respond according to situational factors, as predicted by existing theories of international relations (see discussion of control variables). When a female-led government instigates a dispute, the target state will interpret the aggression in light of female stereotypes and be more likely to reciprocate the dispute. This logic implies that female-led governments, on average, will issue less successful threats and demands than male-led governments.

Hypothesis 1 *Disputes initiated by female-led governments are more likely to be reciprocated by the target state than disputes initiated by male-led governments.*

Following from Hypothesis 1, female-led states must escalate disputes with higher levels of hostility to bargain effectively. When they face initial resistance to their demands, they use escalatory threats and military measures to establish resolve.[13]

Hypothesis 2 *Female-led dispute initiators will escalate disputes to higher hostility levels than male-led dispute initiators.*

[13]According to theories of "audience costs," additional challenger escalation indicates that the target did not view the challenger as resolved. See Eyerman and Hart (1996); Fearon (1994*a*); Haynes (2012); Huth and Allee (2002); Partell and Palmer (1999); Prins and Sprecher (1999). Fearon (1994*a*: 585) argues that "when large audience costs are generated by escalation, fewer escalatory steps are needed credibly to communicate one's preferences."

There is a sense that female leaders should anticipate troubles at the bargaining table and overcompensate early on (Caprioli and Boyer 2001). According to this logic, females, anticipating difficulties at the international level, instigate especially hostile disputes.[14] They provoke reciprocation from the dispute opponent with their initial hostility. However, this interpretation of challenger escalation is also indicative of gender bias. Most research in international relations indicates that challenger escalation demonstrates resolve and *decreases* target reciprocation, not the reverse. If female escalation prompts spirals of escalating hostilities, then this is a very different dynamic than traditional male crisis escalation. It is ultimately possible (and altogether probable) that both mechanisms are at play in empirical reality. The females who anticipate gender bias might escalate a dispute early on, provoking target reciprocation; those females who do not anticipate the bias escalate after initial target reciprocation. In this way, female leaders face a "double bind" in bargaining: female leaders are more likely to face resistance to their demands whether they initially take an aggressive approach or not.[15] Either way, females are more likely to escalate a dispute due to gender biases at work during bargaining interactions.

Research Design

To evaluate these hypotheses, we turn to the Correlates of War (COW) project's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, version 4.01 (Palmer et al. 2015). The unit of the analysis is the dyadic MID, with one initiating state and one target state per observation. MIDs include all "cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state" (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996). While the MID dataset has been criticized for its lack of coercive threats (Downes and Sechser 2012), this dataset provides the best available data on military disputes involving female executives

[14]We are not the first to propose this as a possible explanation for female crisis escalation. Koch and Fulton (2011) posit this is their paper on national security policy in democracies and Caprioli and Boyer (2001) speculate on this in their study of international crises.

[15]See Catalyst, Inc (2007); Pew Research Center (2015); and Snyder (2014).

across space and time.[16]

We compiled a data set of all MIDs between 1980-2010.[17] This resulted in a population of 1,337 dyadic MIDs. However, our theory relies on the unique position of women in the bargaining process. One female leader in an international coalition of numerous male leaders will likely cloud gender effects during the dispute. In order to appropriately assess the role of gender during international disputes, we perform the analyses on bilateral MIDs and MIDs in which there was one challenger.

Dependent variables

To evaluate Hypothesis 1, the analysis here uses TARGET RECIPROCATION to measure the first dependent variable of interest. This variable is coded 1 if the target threatens or uses militarized force to respond to the challenger's threat. It is coded 0 if there was no such militarized response. This measure has been criticized as "a poor indicator of threat effectiveness" because lack of reciprocation does not necessarily mean successful coercion and a reciprocated threat does not necessarily imply a failed threat (Downes and Sechser 2012: 465). Regardless of these (valid) critiques, TARGET RECIPROCATION is especially appropriate to testing our theory for two reasons. First, models of reciprocation have been standard in the literature mainly because reasonable alternatives have not arisen. We can compare the results here to other studies on dispute bargaining by relying on similar data. Second, even if reciprocation does not equal a failed threat, we view military reciprocation as revealing the target state's disregard for the challenger's position. Theories of gender stereotypes predict that dispute opponents should be more likely to reciprocate a female dispute because they perceive female policies as easier to resist.

We replicate the reciprocation models with an alternative specification of the first dependent variable using TARGET HOSTILITY LEVELS. The hostility level of the target is coded

[16]For a more detailed discussion of why we necessarily rely on this dataset in our empirical analysis, please see our discussion in Appendix C of the supplementary files.

[17]We begin our dataset here because only two female democratic leaders (Indira Gandhi and Golda Meir) initiated militarized disputes before then. The 1980s really began the upsurge in female leaders.

as an ordinal variable, with values of 1 (No militarized action), 2 (Threat to use force), 3 (Display of Force), 4 (Use of force), and 5 (War). The TARGET RECIPROCATION variable is coded directly from this variable. We expect female dispute initiation to increase the probability of target escalation.

To evaluate Hypothesis 2, the analysis employs CHALLENGER HOSTILITY LEVELS as a measure of the second dependent variable. The hostility level of the challenger is coded as an ordinal variable in the same way as the hostility level of the target. Our theory dictates that females are more likely to escalate a dispute to higher levels of hostility than male leaders due to initial target reciprocation.

Independent variables

Our primary independent variable is FEMALE, a dummy variable coded 1 if the challenging state in the dyadic MID was headed by a female and 0 if the leader was male. We define "leader" as the head of state who controls foreign policy. We do this because these actors are most prominent in international disputes, being most likely to influence foreign policy and international negotiations. We compiled this variable from the "Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership" (Christensen 2015), but our coding agrees with the extended version of Archigos v 4.1. We cross-checked each observation to ensure that each female leader included in our dataset was indeed in charge of foreign policy during the dispute.[18]

This coding resulted in 36 observations of female MIDs (2.69% of all observations). For bilateral disputes, there are 27 female observations (3.07% of bilateral MIDs). We identified 68 female leaders since 1980, although only 18 of these females were involved in at least one MID. Appendix A of the supplementary files lists all the female leaders involved in militarized disputes between 1980 and 2010.[19]

[18]For example, Pratibha Devisingh Patil was the twelfth President of India from 2007 to 2012. She would not be included in our coding of FEMALE because she was not the Prime Minister handling government foreign policy.

[19]Data of all female leaders, even those not involved in MIDs, are available from the authors upon request.

Control Variables

Existing theories of crisis bargaining emphasize a variety of other factors driving dispute dynamics, including the balance of material capabilities, the issue(s) at stake, alliances, and domestic institutions. When evaluating theories of gender stereotypes compared to traditional theories of dispute bargaining, our theory implies that gender moderates the relative importance of situational variables. Experimental evidence suggests that observers are much more likely to attribute the emotional behavior of a female to her *disposition* and the emotional behavior of a man to the *situation* (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau 2009).[20] Thus, information regarding ostensibly more "objective factors" (e.g., the balance of power and interests, Fearon 1994*b*) still matters in bargaining, but gender biases make it more difficult to use this information to assess the female opponent's resolve. We include several control variables to account for these other factors that have been shown to influence dispute behavior in former studies of dispute bargaining.

For one, the dyadic balance of capabilities in the dispute may influence a state's willingness to initiate, reciprocate, and/or escalate a dispute (Fearon 1994*b*). The Correlate's of War Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score (v. 4) is based on total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. CAPABILITY RATIO captures the relative balance of power between the dispute dyad, the proportion of material capabilities controlled by the challenger in each dyad (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). NUCLEAR accounts for whether the challenger has nuclear capabilities (Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013), which may dampen the target's willingness to escalate a dispute (for fear of prompting nuclear war).

Because contiguous states are at a higher risk of entering a crisis together, contiguous target states may be more likely to resist demands. This variable CONTIGUOUS is drawn from the Correlates of War (COW) Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett et al. 2002). The variable is coded with geographic proximity as equal to 1 if the states in the dispute dyad are separated

[20]For example, when a woman becomes angry, "She is an angry person." When a man becomes angry, "The situation caused his anger" (Brescoll and Uhlmann 2008). Mercer's (1996) important research on reputation-building draws on similar psychological theories of dispositional versus situational attributions.

only by a land or river border and 0 otherwise.

Most research on coercive diplomacy points to the issue at stake a key predictor of why some states resist a threat or escalate a dispute (Art and Cronin 2003; George and Simons 1994; Huth 1988; Snyder and Diesing 1977). ISSUE TYPE is an indicator variable that takes into account the issue at stake and is drawn from the MID dataset. This variable is coded 0 if the value is missing, N/A, or other; 1 if the challenger demands territorial concession TERRITORY; 2 if the challenger demands changes in the target's national POLICY; and 3 if the initiator demands the removal of an individual within the target's government LEADERSHIP.[21]

Scholars have often argued that institutions enable democratic leaders to signal resolve more clearly than non-democratic leaders, thereby reducing the need to escalate a dispute (Fearon 1994*a*; Schultz 2001). NONDEMOCRATIC CHALLENGER accounts for whether the challenger is autocratic. To code this variable, we relied first on Boix, Miller, and Rosato's 2012 dichotomous measure of democracy. For any missing values, we employed the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) coding of democracy. NONDEMOCRATIC TARGET accounts for this possible dynamic from the target's side. This dichotomous variable is coded the same way as the NONDEMOCRATIC CHALLENGER variable.

Finally, threats that appear to violate an existing alliance between two nations may be viewed as less legitimate by the target, and therefore more likely to evoke reciprocation (Gelpi 2003). ALLIANCE is taken from the COW Formal Alliances data set (Gibler 2009). We generate a dichotomous coding of this variable, coding it as 1 if the states in the dispute dyad have any form of alliance between them (defense, neutrality, nonaggression, or entente) in a given year and 0 otherwise.

Empirical Analysis: Model Specification and Findings

For the first set of tests, we employ a logit model due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the target militarily reciprocates a threat and 0 if not. For the second and third sets of tests, we employ ordered logit models, because

[21] Appendix B of the supplementary files analyzes the distribution of MIDs by issue type to dispel concerns that females systematically select their nations into different types of disputes.

both TARGET HOSTILITY LEVELS and CHALLENGER HOSTILITY LEVELS are ordinal variables ranging from 1 to 5. We report robust standard errors, clustered around the challenger in the dispute, to account for possible interdependence among cases with the same challenger that might deflate the standard errors. We report the marginal changes in probability throughout the body of this paper, as these facilitate a more natural interpretation of the effects.[22]

Dispute Reciprocation

How do target states respond to female dispute initiation? In Table 1 we present the first set of logistic regressions to evaluate Hypothesis 1. In these regressions, gender acts as an additional predictor of dispute reciprocation and target escalation in dispute bargaining. Female-led governments face higher levels of reciprocation and hostility levels from target states.

This first set of tests, reported in Models 1-2, considers the effect of FEMALE on dispute reciprocation. The gender of the leader is reliably associated with target resistance, increasing target reciprocation as anticipated by Hypothesis 1. In both models presented in Table 1, the variable for leader gender (FEMALE) is positive and statistically significant at the 90% level or above. In Model 2, the variable FEMALE increase the probability of dispute reciprocation by 15.1 percentage points, other things being equal. This result is statistically significant at the 95% level (*p-value = 0.041*). These patterns of reciprocation lend support to Hypothesis 1, which predicts that female leaders (i.e., female-led governments) will face higher levels of resistance from target states during international disputes, compared with male leaders (i.e., male-led governments).

Target Hostility Levels

We also analyze the response of the target state through TARGET HOSTILITY LEVELS, from which the variable DISPUTE RECIPROCATION is drawn. We find that the target is much more likely to escalate a dispute at every point of escalation when the challenger state is

[22]We estimate these effects through the `margins` command in Stata 13 (StataCorp 2013).

	Target Reciprocation		*Target Hostility*		*Challenger Hostility*	
	1 Bilateral disputes	2 One challenger	3 Bilateral disputes	4 One challenger	5 Bilateral disputes	6 One challenger
FEMALE	0.663⋆	0.714⋆⋆	0.799⋆⋆	0.860⋆⋆	0.742⋆	0.874⋆
	(0.369)	(0.355)	(0.336)	(0.344)	(0.445)	(0.482)
CAPABILITY RATIO	-0.292	-0.635⋆⋆	-0.312	-0.562⋆⋆	0.023	0.036
	(0.291)	(0.284)	(0.299)	(0.279)	(0.351)	(0.306)
NUCLEAR	0.339	0.388⋆	0.408	0.456⋆	-0.467	-0.364
	(0.279)	(0.234)	(0.259)	(0.244)	(0.355)	(0.401)
CONTIGUOUS	1.133⋆⋆⋆	0.943⋆⋆⋆	1.275⋆⋆⋆	1.186⋆⋆⋆	-0.097	0.267
	(0.206)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.191)	(0.265)	(0.240)
TERRITORY	0.748⋆⋆⋆	0.860⋆⋆⋆	0.623⋆⋆⋆	0.619⋆⋆⋆	0.390	0.159
	(0.260)	(0.270)	(0.229)	(0.217)	(0.266)	(0.260)
POLICY	-0.389⋆	-0.450⋆⋆	-0.375⋆	-0.440⋆⋆	0.645⋆⋆⋆	0.339
	(0.212)	(0.221)	(0.217)	(0.223)	(0.172)	(0.206)
LEADERSHIP	-0.661	0.703	-0.630	0.488	0.160	0.224
	(0.468)	(0.617)	(0.481)	(0.423)	(0.463)	(0.315)
NONDEMOCRATIC CHALLENGER	0.326	0.517⋆⋆⋆	0.380⋆	0.495⋆⋆⋆	0.567⋆⋆	0.516⋆
	(0.230)	(0.198)	(0.209)	(0.191)	(0.281)	(0.309)
NONDEMOCRATIC TARGET	-0.077	-0.091	-0.002	0.029	0.051	0.188
	(0.170)	(0.139)	(0.163)	(0.144)	(0.195)	(0.201)
ALLIANCE	-0.090	-0.017	-0.171	-0.104	0.020	-0.013
	(0.187)	(0.207)	(0.195)	(0.207)	(0.170)	(0.209)
CONSTANT	-1.148⋆⋆⋆	-0.904⋆⋆⋆				
	(0.268)	(0.281)				
CUT 1			1.279⋆⋆⋆	1.085⋆⋆⋆	-2.980⋆⋆⋆	-2.771⋆⋆⋆
			(0.266)	(0.286)	(0.397)	(0.430)
CUT 2			1.294⋆⋆⋆	1.158⋆⋆⋆	0.049	0.358
			(0.265)	(0.279)	(0.315)	(0.353)
CUT 3			1.935⋆⋆⋆	1.928⋆⋆⋆	5.902⋆⋆⋆	5.808⋆⋆⋆
			(0.259)	(0.269)	(0.549)	(0.539)
CUT 4			6.473⋆⋆⋆	6.124⋆⋆⋆		
			(0.587)	(0.499)		
N	879	1043	879	1043	879	1043
Pseudo R^2	0.085	0.096	0.067	0.071	0.034	0.024

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
⋆ p <0.10, ⋆⋆ p <0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p <0.01.

Table 1. *Logit estimates of* Dispute Reciprocation *and Ordered Logit estimates of* Target *and* Challenger Hostility Levels.

		Model 4
ΔPr(No militarized action	$\text{female}_{0\rightarrow1}$)	-0.181***
		(0.071)
ΔPr(Threat to use force	$\text{female}_{0\rightarrow1}$)	0.002*
		(0.001)
ΔPr(Display of Force	$\text{female}_{0\rightarrow1}$)	0.035**
		(0.015)
ΔPr(Use of force	$\text{female}_{0\rightarrow1}$)	0.140**
		(0.056)
ΔPr(War	$\text{female}_{0\rightarrow1}$)	0.005*
		(0.003)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Binary and ordinal control variables held constant at median values. Continuous controls held constant at means.

Table 2. *Marginal effect of female on target hostility levels (first differences)*

headed by a woman rather than a man. Table 2 breaks down this variable and reports the marginal effect of FEMALE at every level of escalation. Table 1 reports the coefficients from two models in Models 3–4. The finding is robust at the 95% level or above in both models. Indeed, target states are more likely to escalate to the highest levels of force against a female-led challenger: targets of female threats are 14 percent more likely to resort to force during the dispute (*p-value = 0.012*). Defining the dependent variable as target hostility levels rather than dispute reciprocation further strengthens our findings.

These results are precisely what the logic of gendered perceptions would predict: threats emanating from a challenger will be less effective if the leader is female rather than male. In other words, gender biases do indeed appear to cause the target to underestimate female resolve. Theories of gender stereotypes indicate that while male and female leaders act similarly while in power, international audiences respond differently to similar behavior. Gender stereotypes make it more difficult for the target state to use information regarding capabilities and resolve to update and respond appropriately to female threats and demands. Patterns of dispute reciprocation and target hostility among MIDs lend initial support for this logic to be operating at the international level.

		Model 6
ΔPr(Threat to use force		$\text{female}_{0\rightarrow1}$)	-0.027*
			(0.015)
ΔPr(Display of Force		$\text{female}_{0\rightarrow1}$)	-0.177*
			(0.099)
ΔPr(Use of force		$\text{female}_{0\rightarrow1}$)	0.198*
			(0.109)
ΔPr(War		$\text{female}_{0\rightarrow1}$)	0.006
			(0.004)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Binary and ordinal control variables held constant at median values. Continuous controls held constant at means.

Table 3. *Marginal effect of female on challenger hostility levels (first differences)*

Challenger Hostility Levels

Next, we examine whether initial target reciprocation influences challenger hostility levels. The empirical results in Table 1 (Models 5–6) estimate the effects of FEMALE on the probability of challenger escalation. Hypothesis 2 predicts that female leaders will be more likely to escalate a crisis to higher hostility levels, through the use of force or war, than their male counterparts – due, at least in part, to initial target reciprocation.

This second set of tests, also reported in Table 3, evaluates Hypothesis 2. Female challengers (i.e., female-led governments) are significantly more likely to escalate to higher levels of force than their male counterparts. In order to assess the substantive effects, we estimate the marginal effect of FEMALE on the probability that a female leader stops escalation at each hostility level. As reported in Table 3, the probability of escalation to a hostility level of 4 (Use of force) and 5 (War) increases with a female initiator. A female leader is 19.8 percent more likely to escalate a dispute with the use of force when compared to a male leader; this effect is statistically significant at the 95% level. Note also that women are less likely to stop escalation with a threat or display of force. Overall, female-led governments are more likely to escalate disputes to the highest hostility levels than are male-led governments.

These results strongly support Hypothesis 2, which predicts that females and/or female-led governments must escalate disputes in order to overcompensate for gender biases and

establish credibility with the bargaining opponent. Traditional theories of bargaining would predict no effect for gender, since male and female challengers face similar situational constraints. However, because female leaders either anticipate or encounter difficulties during dispute bargaining, they must enact more aggressive policies to overcome problems of perceptions in dispute opponents. These patterns of escalation provide further evidence of gender bias at the international level.

Discussion: Selection Effects and Data Limitations

The most difficult challenges to overcome in the analysis of female bargaining are those of selection effects and data limitations. We address these concerns below although readily admit that further study and data generation (i.e., more female leaders) must occur before we can definitively dismiss any of these considerations.

First, research has shown that females frequently come to power under particular circumstances (Jalalzai 2004). Many women leaders rise through political families or dynasties, suggesting that there might be some special reputation associated with them. However, we believe that this empirical fact should bias our results *away* from finding higher levels of reciprocation and escalation. Women with strong political ties should be viewed as more established, credible opponents on the international stage. Women coming from political families can use the reputations of their male relatives to improve their international reputation for toughness. If anything, the women in our dataset who arose through dynastic processes should be more effective bargainers than their non-dynastic counterparts, thereby decreasing the probability of reciprocation and the need to escalate. These "dynastic" observations should bias the data away from the patterns uncovered in this paper.[23]

Closely related to this is differing domestic incentives. The female leaders analyzed in this paper have mostly risen through democratic processes, but it is possible that women come to power with systematically different levels of domestic support. If females come to power with

[23]We check whether certain female leaders – such as Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher, or Tansu Ciller – unduly influence the findings of this paper. Excluding these female leaders from the dataset changes neither the substance nor significance of the results.

unprecedented levels of support, institutional constraints might fall away and facilitate more dispute initiation. On the other hand, if women are more likely to come to power during difficult times (e.g. Beckwith 2015; O'Brien 2015), the domestic situation may cause female leaders to select themselves into crises more frequently as a diversionary tactic or to *gamble for survival* (Chiozza and Goemans 2011*b*).[24] International audiences may view female leaders as rash and therefore less resolved due to unique domestic conditions. This is a serious alternative to our proposed theoretical mechanism; but we believe such domestic incentives likely supplement rather than replace our theory of international perceptions.[25] Additionally, recent work has found that even democratic institutions are much less transparent than assumed (Snyder and Borghard 2011; Trachtenberg 2012). Even if females do come to power under systematically different domestic conditions, these domestic factors are unlikely to influence bargaining interactions.

Also, there is evidence that women are selected into office for their pacifying effect on foreign policy (Enloe 1989: 6), and countries may turn to women when they are exhausted by war or otherwise disinclined to fight (e.g., Lawless 2004).[26] According to this logic, international leaders might reciprocate bluffs at a higher rate due to actual female weakness. However, the empirical record demonstrates otherwise. The women who make it to the highest levels office may be different from other women, but they differ little from other (male) leaders. Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015) find that females and males are, on average, equally risk-averse and aggressive, suggesting that men and women in leadership differ little in observable traits.[27]

[24]Gambling for survival is more likely to be a nondemocratic tactic because of the high costs of forcible removal. Indeed, high risk of regular removal (democratic elections) from office should make leaders less likely to initiate conflict.

[25]The necessary cross-national public opinion and legislative data does not currently exist to test this pathway.

[26]Steinberg (2007) argues that Indira Gandhi was initially selected into power in part for her "weak" or "feminine" qualities. However, the experience of Margaret Thatcher suggests the opposite, indicating that female leaders are selected into office in part because they behave in a more masculine manner. These selection processes likely balance out in the aggregate.

[27]We check whether certain leadership characteristics from the LEAD dataset (Horowitz and Stam 2014) – such as leadership age, marital status, political experience, and time in office – have an effect on the dependent variables in this paper. Aside from age, these individual-level variables have no discernible impact on either dispute reciprocation or challenger hostility levels in this dataset. They also do not mediate the impact of gender.

Finally, we recognize the inherent difficulties in studying this question at the present time. The sample of female leaders is small, and the sample of female leaders involved in militarized disputes is even smaller. We cannot establish definitively what is driving the findings of this paper. However, these early quantitative results, mounting evidence in experimental literature on gender stereotypes, and government statements disparaging female foreign policy lend preliminary support to our theory. Females do appear to face unique challenges in international bargaining, just as they do in other societal and leadership contexts. As more and better data becomes available regarding these leaders, we hope that further studies can more thoroughly explore this important question.

The evidence provided above indicates that on average female leaders encounter differential challenges in interstate bargaining. They are more likely to have their threats reciprocated and to escalate a dispute compared with their male counterparts. But it is important to note that while the quantitative evidence is consistent with the logic of gender stereotypes, it is not direct evidence that gender biases play a role in dispute decision-making. Can we find evidence of the proposed mechanisms described earlier in the paper? Do females face gendered perceptions of their actions from dispute opponents? The following section presents a case illustration of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War as a particularly clear-cut example of how female leaders can face explicit gender bias during international bargaining.

Indira Gandhi and the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War

> *"Mrs. Gandhi is neither a woman nor a head of state by wanting to be both at once."* – Pakistani President Yahya Khan[28]

To illustrate the mechanisms behind our theory, we conduct a brief case study on Indira Gandhi's role in the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971.[29] Gender biases are frequently implicit, manifesting themselves in patterns of biased behavior rather than explicit articulations of prejudice. Regardless, we find numerous statements discounting Gandhi, her leadership,

[28]Gupte (2009: 403)

[29]Gandhi was the only child of India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and she became the first female democratic leader in 1966.

and her policy actions based on her gender in this case study. Additionally, while our theory focuses on target state reactions, we also present evidence that other nations reacted to her policies according to the logic of gender stereotypes.

After a disputed election result between West and East Pakistan in December 1970, Pakistani President Yahya Khan suspended civil and political liberties in East Pakistan and initiated a military-sponsored genocide of Bengali citizens there. Survivors fled to neighboring India, deluging India's weak welfare state with refugees. Indira Gandhi's "initial and instinctive reaction was to give immediate recognition to a free Bangladesh and to back the liberation struggle and the resistance movement..."[30] However, her army chiefs and Foreign Minister persuaded her to wait until India could better prepare for any conflict that might arise with Pakistan should India throw its full weight behind a free Bangladesh.

In the meantime, Gandhi attempted to alleviate the humanitarian crisis through diplomatic means. She campaigned internationally for the freedom of the Bangladeshi people, but negotiations with world leaders fell on deaf ears. The following U.S. reactions provide some evidence of gender stereotypes operating during early negotiations. First, the United States disparaged her as a female leader. The recorded conversations between President Nixon and his advisers during the Bangladesh Liberation War "are rife with gendered speech and appeals to masculine 'toughness' that colored Nixon's actions" (Nichter and Moss 2010). Indira Gandhi is described as a "prune – bitter, kind of pushy, horrible woman" by Jackie Kennedy,[31] an "old witch" (Warner 2005: 1109), and "a bitch" by Nixon and Kissinger (Chowdhury 2005). Second, the "double bind" was also at play: Regardless of Gandhi's approach – whether diplomatic or military – the U.S. resisted her policies. At first, the United States disliked her diplomatic approach, but eventually the administration also criticized her militaristic policy toward the Bangladeshi issue. Finally, the United States did not perceive Gandhi as capable of achieving her hard-line policy goals, much in line with the logic of gender stereotypes. Nixon and Kissinger mocked her for being backed into the corner by U.S. policy (Warner 2005; Chowdhury 2005). As the dispute progressed, Kissinger claimed

[30]Warner (2005: 1106), quoting J.N. Dixit, an Indian Foreign Services Official responsible for monitoring the crisis.

[31]Longbottom *Daily Mail*.

that Gandhi's real yet unrealizable goals lay in the annihilation of Pakistani forces altogether and a power grab in the Middle East (Warner 2005: 1112).

More importantly, Gandhi lacked credibility with her opponent, Pakistan, which also focused on Gandhi's gender as a liability in foreign affairs. In August 1971, while Gandhi was pursuing diplomatic options internationally, Pakistani President Yahya Khan discussed Gandhi and her term in office with *Le Figaro*, the French publication, saying, "Mrs. Gandhi is neither a woman nor a head of state by wanting to be both at once." What would he say to Gandhi if there were to be a meeting between the two leaders, the interviewer asked? "I would say: 'Shut up, woman – leave me alone and let my refugees back"' (Gupte 2009: 403). As evident in the first excerpt, President Khan perceived a disconnect between the qualities associated with leadership (agentic) and those that were female (communal) as predicted by theories of gendered leadership. He then dismissed her as a credible bargaining opponent.

Frustrated by lack of progress, Gandhi unilaterally approved the establishment of a joint military command of Indian forces and Bangladeshi guerrillas on November 12, 1971. This plan drew up "immediate plans for full-scale operations against the Pakistani armed forces in Bangladesh."[32] According to several sources, Gandhi made it extremely clear that India would wage war unless Pakistan liberated Bangladesh. Regardless, her threats to intervene were interpreted as a bluff. President Khan's response to Indian threats was one of disbelief: "If that woman [Indira Gandhi] thinks she is going to cow me down, I refuse to take it. If she wants to fight, I'll fight her!" (Malhotra 1989: 137). Yahya Khan could not perceive Gandhi's willingness to fight and ability to win the conflict. In reaction to Indian threats and mobilizations, Pakistan preemptively attacked India on December 3, drawing India into the war that same day. India recognized Bangladesh as an independent nation three days later – and defeated Pakistan militarily within thirteen days.

After the fact, President Yahya Khan stated that he would have responded in a more flexible and less violent manner against India had a male headed the Indian government during the conflict (Weart 1998: 206).[33] He admitted that his escalatory approach was shaped by the gender of his dispute opponent. Due in part to gender biases, Khan resisted

[32]Dixit, as quoted in Warner (2005: 1110).
[33]See also Stoessinger (1990: 135-136).

threats that he might have conceded to had they been issued by a man. This provides evidence, albeit ad hoc, that target states are more likely to reciprocate female threats. In response to Pakistani miscalculation, Gandhi escalated the crisis to war.

Pakistan's preemptive strike is puzzling given its especially rapid defeat. What type of information did Pakistan miss in waging war against India? West Pakistan launched a war on two fronts (in Bangladesh and India), directly drawing in Indian military forces against them. India defeated West Pakistani forces and established Bangladeshi independence in a mere thirteen days. One of the reasons for such a gross miscalculation is likely underestimation of Indian, and more specifically Gandhi's, resolve. Pakistan and the other international actors held gendered biases that made it more difficult for them to discern Gandhi's resolve.

Conclusions and Implications

> *"It's really important not to wall yourself off from how you are actually feeling about what people say or how they treat you or how they treat somebody else that offends you or upsets you. But you're also as a woman in a high public position or seeking the presidency, as I am, you have to be aware of how people will judge you for being, quote, 'emotional.' And so it's a really delicate balancing act."*
>
> – U.S. Presidential nominee Hillary Clinton[34]

This paper contributes to recent scholarship on leaders in international relations, although it turns the focus from leadership characteristics to perceptions of leadership and reactions to state behavior. While a number of scholars have argued that gender, specifically gender equality, has a pacifying effect on foreign policy,[35] we find that this pacifying effect does not operate at the executive level due to gender bias. Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015) did not find a relationship between national leader gender and propensities for interstate conflict, but we believe our findings are compatible with theirs. Female leaders may differ little from male leaders in conflict proneness, but gender biases provoke higher levels of escalation *after*

[34]White (2016)

[35]See, for example, Caprioli (2000); Goldstein (2001); Hudson et al. (2012); Regan and Paskeviciute (2003). For a recent update to this finding, see Schroeder (2017).

a dispute has begun. Our findings also agree with Koch and Fulton (2011), who found that female national leaders are associated with higher levels of defense spending and conflict. Our paper makes a unique contribution by systematically exploring reactions to female-led states, rather than focusing exclusively on female violence/conflict proneness.

Additionally, we draw on much existing work that focuses on the role of female leaders in other contexts. Empirical work on gendered leadership either explains the domestic consequences of being a female leader (Jalalzai and Krook 2010) or utilizes psychological assessments to study the impact that different character traits have on foreign policy decisions (Steinberg 2007) and management styles generally (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt 2001). Women in parliaments, bureaucracies, and civil society lead in a more collaborative fashion and are shown to have pacific effects on government policy (e.g., Jalalzai 2004; Koch and Fulton 2011; Barnes 2016). These contributions however do not address the challenges that women leaders face when negotiating in the international arena, the focus of our paper.

Finally, we apply theories of gendered misperceptions to the rationalist bargaining literature (Fearon 1995). Gender bias makes it more difficult to mitigate informational problems in international bargaining. We find that these gender biases can make it more difficult for international actors to resolve situations of private information. Further research should be done to explore whether these biases continue even after war has broken out and to what extent gender stereotypes can be alleviated at the international level.

Indeed, the policy implications of this study affect dispute resolution in tangible ways. Pakistan's thirteen-day loss is indicative of Pakistan's miscalculation of India's resolve. This misunderstanding of female leadership can result in unnecessary costs, both in terms of the political costs associated with precipitating an unnecessary war and the material cost in human lives and national resources. Additionally, while this paper disaggregates by gender, this is just one way to split the data. If perceptions and biases regarding gender matter in international relations (alongside institutional configurations, the balance of power, public opinion, etc.), we could see biases regarding religion, language, and ethnicity also affecting bargaining.[36] All of this implies the need for diverse decision-making bodies and foreign policy

[36]Gender stereotypes are shown to be pervasive in a host of situations (Plant et al. 2000) and are likely just one of the biases operating at the leadership level. See Jervis (1976) and Lebow (1981)

advisors to interpret incoming information and avoid these gendered/racial/religious/ethnic perceptions. Diversity may become critical to a state's ability to signal intentions, interpret information, and avoid war.

However, there is unfortunately evidence that biases and stereotypes operate within groups (in this case, between women) as well. Even with this possibility, there is cause for hope: Female politicians are cognizant of the challenges they face and can make some efforts to counter these challenges. However, as Hillary Clinton noted about her own Presidential campaign, it is "a really delicate balancing act" that women cannot always succeed at. We can hope that, as females become more common in the international arena and research on gender increases (Reiter 2015), perhaps gender stereotypes will, like Hegel's renowned owl of Minerva, vanish only as we comprehend their effects.

as seminal research on biases in International Relations. In sum, "[t]he most severe challenge to bargaining theory arises from the cognitive and decision-making biases" (Lake 2011: 45).

References

Art, Robert J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. 2003. *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace.

Barnes, Tiffany D. 2016. *Gendering Legislative Behavior.* Cambridge University Press.

Barrett, Lisa Feldman and Eliza Bliss-Moreau. 2009. "She's emotional. He's having a bad day: Attributional explanations for emotion stereotypes." *Emotion* 9(5):649.

Bauer, Nichole M. 2015. "Who Stereotypes Female Candidates? Identifying Individual Differences in Feminine Stereotype reliance." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 3(1):94–110.

Beckwith, Karen. 2015. "Before Prime Minister: Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel, and Gendered Party Leadership Contests." *Politics & Gender* 11(04):718–745.

Bloom, Mia. 2011. *Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists.* London, UK: Hurst.

Bohlen, Celestine. 2014. "Putin Puts Tough Image Before Words." *New York Times* .
URL: *http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/world/europe/putin-puts-tough-image-before-words.html*

Boix, Carles, Michael Miller and Sebastian Rosato. 2012. "A Complete Data set of Political Regimes, 1800–2007." *Comparative Political Studies* pp. 1–32.

Bosson, Jennifer K and Joseph A Vandello. 2011. "Precarious Manhood and Its Links to Action and Aggression." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 20(2):82–86.

Brescoll, Victoria L. 2016. "Leading with Their Hearts? How Gender Stereotypes of Emotion Lead to Biased Evaluations of Female Leaders." *The Leadership Quarterly* 27(3):415–428.

Brescoll, Victoria L and Eric Luis Uhlmann. 2008. "Can an angry woman get ahead? Status conferral, gender, and expression of emotion in the workplace." *Psychological Science* 19(3):268–275.

Byman, Daniel L and Kenneth M Pollack. 2001. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." *International Security* 25(4):107–146.

Caprioli, Mary. 2000. "Gendered Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 37(1):51–68.

Caprioli, Mary and Mark A Boyer. 2001. "Gender, Violence, and International Crisis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4):503–518.

Catalyst, Inc. 2007. *The Double-bind Dilemma for Women in Leadership: Damned If You Do, Doomed If You Don't.* Catalyst.

Charness, Gary and Uri Gneezy. 2012. "Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Risk Taking." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 83(1):50–58.

Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice* 143(1-2):67–101.

Chiozza, Giacomo and Hein E Goemans. 2004. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3):604–619.

Chiozza, Giacomo and Hein Erich Goemans. 2011*a*. *Leaders and International Conflict.* Cambridge University Press.

Chiozza, Giacomo and Hein Erich Goemans. 2011*b*. *Leaders and International Conflict.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chowdhury, Debasish Roy. 2005. "'Indians are Bastards Anyway'." *Asia Times. http://www. atimes. com/atimes/South_ Asia/GF23Df04. html* .

Christensen, Martin Iversen. 2015. "Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership.".
URL: *http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/index.html* (Accessed 5 August 2015)

Clyber, Adam. 2001. "Book says Nixon considered a woman for the Supreme Court." *New York Times* .
URL: *http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/us/book-says-nixon-considered-a-woman-for-supreme-court.html*

Coffey, Bentley and Patrick A McLaughlin. 2009. "Do masculine names help female lawyers become judges? Evidence from South Carolina." *American Law and Economics Review* 11(1):112–133.

Croco, Sarah. 2015. *Peace at What Price? Leaders and the Domestic Politics of War Termination.* Cambridge University Press.

Croco, Sarah E and Scott Sigmund Gartner. 2014. "Flip-flops and High Heels: An Experimental Analysis of Elite Position Change and Gender on Wartime Public Support." *International Interactions* 40(1):1–24.

Debs, Alexandre and Hein E Goemans. 2010. "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War." *American Political Science Review* 104(03):430–445.

Dolan, Kathleen. 2011. "Do Women and Men Know Different Things? Measuring Gender Differences in Political Knowledge." *The Journal of Politics* 73(01):97–107.

Dolan, Kathleen. 2014. *When Does Gender Matter?: Women Candidates and Gender Stereotypes in American Elections*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Dovidio, John F and Samuel L Gaertner. 2000. "Aversive racism and selection decisions: 1989 and 1999." *Psychological science* 11(4):315–319.

Downes, Alexander B. and Todd S. Sechser. 2012. "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility." *International Organization* 66(3):457–89.

Dube, Oeindrila and S. P. Harish. 2017. "Queens". *Working paper*.

Eager, Paige Whaley. 2016. *From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists: Women and Political Violence*. Routledge.

Eagly, Alice H and Mary C Johannesen-Schmidt. 2001. "The Leadership Styles of Women and Men." *Journal of Social Issues* 57(4):781–797.

Eagly, Alice H and Steven J Karau. 2002. "Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders." *Psychological review* 109(3):573.

Eichenberg, Richard C. 2003. "Gender Differences in Public Attitudes Toward the Use of Force by the United States, 1990–2003." *International Security* 28(1):110–141.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Eyerman, Joe and Robert A. Hart. 1996. "An Empirical Test of The Audience Cost Proposition: Democracy Speaks Louder than Words." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(4):597–616.

Fearon, James D. 1994*a*. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88(3):577–592.

Fearon, James D. 1994*b*. "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2):236–269.

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization*

49(3):379–414.

Fiske, Susan T. 2002. "What we know now about bias and intergroup conflict, the problem of the century." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 11(4):123–128.

Fiske, Susan T, Amy JC Cuddy, Peter Glick and Jun Xu. 2002. "A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 82(6):878.

Fox, Richard L and Jennifer L Lawless. 2011. "Gendered Perceptions and Political Candidacies: A Central Barrier to Women's Equality in Electoral Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1):59–73.

Freedman, Lawrence and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. 1990. *Signals of War: the Falklands Conflict of 1982*. Princeton University Press.

Fuhrmann, Matthew and Michael C Horowitz. 2015. "When Leaders Matter: Rebel Experience and Nuclear Proliferation." *The Journal of Politics* 77(1):72–87.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1998. "Women and the Evolution of World Politics." *Foreign Affairs* pp. 24–40.

Gelpi, Christopher. 2003. *The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

George, Alexander L. and William E. Simons. 1994. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. 2d ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2009. *International Military Alliances, 1648-2008*. CQ Press.

Goemans, Hein E. 2000. "Fighting for Survival The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(5):555–579.

Goldin, Claudia and Cecilia Rouse. 1997. Orchestrating impartiality: The impact of 'blind' auditions on female musicians. Technical report National bureau of economic research.

Goldstein, Joshua S. 2001. *War and Gender*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Guisinger, Alexandra. 2016. "Information, Gender, and Differences in Individual Preferences for Trade." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 37(4):538–561.

Gupte, Pranay. 2009. *Mother India: a Political Biography of Indira Gandhi*. New Dehli: Penguin Books India.

Hayes, Danny and Jennifer L Lawless. 2013. A Non-gendered lens: The Absence of Stereotyping in Contemporary Congressional Elections. In *Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Orlando, FL*.

Haynes, Kyle. 2012. "Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy Do Executive Term Limits Reduce the Effectiveness of Democratic Threats?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(5):771–798.

Heilman, Madeline E, Aaron S Wallen, Daniella Fuchs and Melinda M Tamkins. 2004. "Penalties for success: reactions to women who succeed at male gender-typed tasks." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 89(3):416.

Heilman, Madeline E and Tyler G Okimoto. 2008. "Why are Women Penalized for Success at Male Tasks? The Implied Communality Deficit." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 92(1):81.

Hess, Ursula, Sacha Senécal, Gilles Kirouac, Pedro Herrera, Pierre Philippot and Robert E Kleck. 2000. "Emotional expressivity in men and women: Stereotypes and self-perceptions." *Cognition & Emotion* 14(5):609–642.

Horowitz, Michael C and Allan C Stam. 2014. "How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders." *International Organization* 68(03):527–559.

Horowitz, Michael C, Allan C Stam and Cali M Ellis. 2015. *Why Leaders Fight*. Cambridge University Press.

Huddy, Leonie and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. "The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office." *Political Research Quarterly* 46(3):503–525.

Hudson, Valerie M., Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli and Chad F. Emmett. 2012. *Sex and World Peace*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hunt, Christopher John, Karen Gonsalkorale and Stuart B Murray. 2013. "Threatened Masculinity and Muscularity: An Experimental Examination of Multiple Aspects of Muscularity in Men." *Body image* 10(3):290–299.

Huth, Paul K. 1988. *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Huth, Paul K and Todd L Allee. 2002. "Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(6):754–790.

Jalalzai, Farida. 2004. "Women Political Leaders: Past and present." *Women & Politics* 26(3-4):85–108.

Jalalzai, Farida and Mona Lena Krook. 2010. "Beyond Hillary and Benazir: Women's Political Leadership Worldwide." *International Political Science Review* 31(1):5–21.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Vol. 49 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jones, Daniel M, Stuart A Bremer and J David Singer. 1996. "Militarized interstate disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, coding rules, and empirical patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15(2):163–213.

Koch, Michael T and Sarah A Fulton. 2011. "In the Defense of Women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 73(01):1–16.

Lake, David A. 2011. "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War." *International Security* 35(3):7–52.

Lawless, Jennifer L. 2004. "Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era." *Political Research Quarterly* 57(3):479–490.

Lawless, Jennifer L. 2015. "Female Candidates and Legislators." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18:349–366.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Malhotra, Inder. 1989. *Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography*. Northeastern University Press.

Maxfield, David, Joseph Grenny and Chase McMillan. 2015. "Emotional Inequality: Solutions for women in the workplace.".

McDermott, Rose. 2004. *Political Psychology in International Relations*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

McGlen, Nancy E and Meredith Reid Sarkees. 1993. *Women in Foreign Policy: The Insiders*. Routledge New York.

Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. *Reputation and International Politics*. Cornell University Press.

Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics." *International Organization* 59(01):77–106.

Moss-Racusin, Corinne A, John F Dovidio, Victoria L Brescoll, Mark J Graham and Jo Handelsman. 2012. "Science faculty's subtle gender biases favor male students." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 109(41):16474–16479.

Nichter, Luke A and Richard A Moss. 2010. "Superpower Relations, Backchannels, and the Subcontinent." *Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies* 2(3):47–75.

Nosek, Brian A, Mahzarin Banaji and Anthony G Greenwald. 2002. "Harvesting implicit group attitudes and beliefs from a demonstration web site." *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice* 6(1):101.

O'Brien, Diana Z. 2015. "Rising to the Top: Gender, Political Performance, and Party Leadership in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4):1022–1039.

Okimoto, Tyler G and Victoria L Brescoll. 2010. "The price of power: Power seeking and backlash against female politicians." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 36(7):923–936.

Palmer, Glenn, Vito d'Orazio, Michael Kenwick and Matthew Lane. 2015. "The MID4 dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, coding rules and description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32(2):222–242.

Partell, Peter J. and Glenn Palmer. 1999. "Audience costs and interstate crises: An empirical assessment of Fearon's model of dispute outcomes." *International Studies Quarterly* 43(2):389–405.

Pew Research Center. 2015. "Public Says Women are Equally Qualified, but Barriers Persist.".

Plant, E Ashby, Janet Shibley Hyde, Dacher Keltner and Patricia G Devine. 2000. "The gender stereotyping of emotions." *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 24(1):81–92.

Prins, Brandon C and Christopher Sprecher. 1999. "Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition, and Interstate Dispute Escalation: Evidence from Parliamentary Systems, 1946-89." *Journal of Peace Research* 36(3):271–287.

Regan, Patrick M and Aida Paskeviciute. 2003. "Women's Access to Politics and Peaceful

States." *Journal of Peace Research* 40(3):287–302.

Reiter, Dan. 2015. "The Positivist Study of Gender and International Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7):1301–1326.

Salerno, Jessica M and Liana C Peter-Hagene. 2015. "One angry woman: Anger expression increases influence for men, but decreases influence for women, during group deliberation." *Law and human behavior* 39(6):581.

Saunders, Elizabeth Nathan. 2011. *Leaders At War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*. Cornell University Press.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schroeder, Theresa. 2017. "When Security Dominates the Agenda: The Influence of Ongoing Security Threats on Female Representation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(3):564–589.

Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sechser, Todd S and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail." *International Organization* 67(01):173–195.

Shields, Stephanie A. 2002. *Speaking From the Heart: Gender and the Social Meaning of Emotion*. Cambridge University Press.

Singer, J David, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." *Peace, War, and Numbers* 19.

Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing. 1977. *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Snyder, Jack and Erica Borghard. 2011. "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound." *American Political Science Review* 105(3):437–456.

Snyder, Kieran. 2014. "The Abrasiveness Trap: High-achieving men and women are described differently in reviews." *Fortune Magazine* pp. 627–660.

StataCorp. 2013. "Stata Statistical Software: Release 13.".

Steinberg, Blema S. 2007. *Women in Power: The Personality and Leadership Style of Indira Gandhi, Golda Meir and Margaret Thatcher*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Stinnett, Douglas M, Jaroslav Tir, Paul F Diehl, Philip Schafer and Charles Gochman. 2002. "The Correlates of War (COW) project direct contiguity data, version 3.0." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2):59–67.

Stoessinger, John. 1990. *Why Nations Go to War*. New York: St. Martin's.

Swers, Michele. 2007. "Building a Reputation on National Security: The Impact of Stereotypes Related to Gender and Military Experience." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 32(4):559–595.

Sykes, Patricia Lee. 1993. Woman as National Leaders: Patterns and Prospects. In *Women as National Leaders*, ed. Michael A. Genovese. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Thomas, Jakana L and Kanisha D Bond. 2015. "Women's Participation in Violent Political Organizations." *American Political Science Review* 109(03):488–506.

Trachtenberg, Marc. 2012. "Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis." *Security Studies* 21(1):3–42.

Warner, Geoffrey. 2005. "Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971." *International Affairs* 81(5):1097–1118.

Weart, Spencer R. 1998. *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another*. Yale University Press.

White, E. M. 2016. "Hillary Clinton Interviewed By Amanda de Cadenet." *Hillary Clinton Speeches* .

URL: *https://hillaryspeeches.com/2016/01/13/hillary-clinton-to-be-interviewed-by-amanda-de-cadenet/*

Willer, Robb, Christabel L Rogalin, Bridget Conlon and Michael T Wojnowicz. 2013. "Overdoing Gender: A Test of the Masculine Overcompensation Thesis." *American Journal of Sociology* 118(4):980–1022.

Zammuner, Vanda L. 2000. "Men's and Women's Lay Theories of Emotion." *Gender and Emotion: Social Psychological Perspectives* p. 48.

Zell, Ethan, Zlatan Krizan and Sabrina R Teeter. 2015. "Evaluating gender similarities and differences using metasynthesis." *American Psychologist* 70(1):10.